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In a previous paper, we have introduced the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule to deal with
situations where each agent requests a list of goods that may be private, public, or speciﬁct o
some agents and where aggregate demand is not necessarily the sum of individual demands.
This rule admits general paths along which demands may be scaled down to construct
intermediate demands. We now pursue the analysis of this rule by examining how the cost
share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents. We
also provide bounds for cost shares under the assumption that the cost function satisﬁes an
appropriate deﬁnition of decreasing or increasing incremental cost.
Keywords: Serial cost sharing, multi products, monotonicity, bounds.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D63, C71
Résumé
Dans un précédent article, on a introduit la règle séquentielle avec sentiers (Path Serial
Rule) pour le partage des coûts dans des situations où chaque agent demande une liste de
biens qui peuvent être privés, publics ou spéciﬁques à certains d’entre eux et où la demande
agrégée n’est pas nécessairement la somme des demandes individuelles. Cette règle autorise
des sentiers généraux le long desquels les demandes peuvent être réduites pour construire les
demandes intermédiaires. On poursuit ici l’analyse de cette règle, en étudiant notamment
la variation de la part du coût d’un agent par rapport à sa demande et à celles des autres
agents. On montre également que, sous l’hypothèse que la fonction de coût satisfait une
déﬁnition appropriée de coût incrémental croissant ou décroissant, les contributions exigées
des agents avec cette règle se situent à l’intérieur de bornes raisonnables.Contents
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When facing a cost sharing problem, a planner will usually look for a rule that have desirable
properties. The original Serial Cost Sharing Rule, introduced by Shenker (1990) and analyzed
extensively by Moulin and Shenker (1992, 1994) and Moulin (1996), fares well in this respect.
This rule is characterized by two ethical axioms: Equal Treatment of Equals (in terms of
demands) and Independence of Larger Demands (a protection of small demanders against
larger ones). It also satisﬁes Demand-Monotonicity and Cross-Monotonicity under increasing
returns: the ﬁrst means that the cost share of each agent does not decrease with its own
demand, so that no agent has an incentive to overstate its needs; as for the second, if an
increase in the demand of an agent lowers average cost, the cost shares of other agents do
n o ti n c r e a s e .I na d d i t i o n ,t h i sr u l ep r o d u c e sc o s ts h a r e st h a tl i eb e t w e e nr e a s o n a b l eb o u n d s
and under increasing returns, no agent and no subset of agents pay more than their stand
alone cost (the Stand Alone or Participation Test).
Sprumont (1998) proposes an extension of this rule, namely the Axial Serial Rule, for
the case where each agent requests a single speciﬁc good. Koster et al.(1998) propose a
similar extension, the Radial Serial Rule, for the context where agents request several but
homogeneous private goods. In Téjédo and Truchon (2002), we have introduced the Path
Serial Cost Sharing Rule to deal with still more general situations where each agent requests
a list of goods that may be private, public, or speciﬁc to some agents and where aggregate
demand is not necessarily the sum of individual demands. As its name indicates, this rule
admits general paths along which demands may be scaled down to construct intermediate
demands. It encompasses both the Axial Rule of Sprumont (1998) and the Radial Rule of
Koster et al.(1998) as special cases.
Our purpose here is to extend the monotonicity and participation results of the original
rule to the multidimensional context of the Path Serial Rule. In order to do so, we need a
satisfactory concept of increasing returns for this context. Before explaining this concept,
we brieﬂy recall the principles behind the original Serial Rule and the Path Serial Rule.
The original Serial Rule was conceived for problems where n agents request diﬀerent
quantities of a private good, the sum of which is produced by a single facility. With this
rule, agents are ﬁrst ordered according to their demands. Then, the cost of producing n times
the demand of agent 1, which is called an intermediate demand, is shared equally among
all agents. In addition, agents 2 to n must bear equally the incremental cost of another
intermediate demand in which the demand of agents 3 to n is equal to the demand of agent
2. And so on until total demand is satisﬁed.
1There are two problems to be addressed in order to extend the original Serial Rule to the
general context that we consider. The ﬁrst is the comparison of individual demands, which
may bear on diﬀerent goods in addition to being multidimensional. Sprumont (1998) and
Koster et al.(1998) use stand alone costs as the basis for comparing and ordering demands
or agents. Although disputable, we adopt the same principle. The second problem is the
reduction of individual demands in order to obtain equivalent demands. Koster et al.chose
to do so in a proportional way (along a ray), which leads to their Radial Serial Rule. They
also point out that this reduction could be done along other paths.
In Téjédo and Truchon (2002), we follow this more general approach. Allowing for more
general paths instead of rays may prove useful for some problems. Since these paths may
depend on the problem, we take the position that, in addition to the demand and the
cost function, a general cost sharing problem should specify the paths along which demands
must be scaled down to construct intermediate demands. The Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule
applies to these general problems. It is characterized by the Equal Treatment of Equivalent
Demands (in terms of stand alone costs) and the Path Serial Principle (a weaker form of
Independence of Larger Demands). It also satisﬁes a general scale invariance condition
deﬁned and called Ordinality by Sprumont (1998).
Deﬁning a satisfactory concept of increasing returns or more precisely decreasing incre-
mental cost in this general context is not obvious. The problem comes from the fact that we
must compare the incremental costs of changes in diﬀerent and heterogeneous components
of the demand. We give a deﬁnition that becomes intuitive once we accept the point of
view that heterogenous changes in the demand may be ordered according to their impacts
on total cost. This is consistent with the ordering of individual demands in terms of their
stand alone costs, a practice common to the Axial, the Radial, and the Path Serial Rules.
Our deﬁnition has interesting and useful implications. One of them says that the total
cost change divided by the number of agents responsible for this change should not be less
than the incremental cost of any of the individual changes in the demand. This is similar to
the property that a concave one-good cost function gives an average cost that it not lower
than marginal cost. Another implication is to the eﬀect that second order right derivatives in
non-negative directions must not be positive. It is reminiscent of another property of concave
functions although weaker. A third implication is increasing beneﬁt from cooperation.
With this deﬁnition and its implications in hands, we then show that the Path Serial Rule
satisﬁes what we call Negative Path Cross Monotonicity and the Stand Alone or Participation
Test when the cost function has the diminishing incremental cost property. It satisﬁes the
reverse of these conditions under increasing incremental cost. We also show that the Path
2Serial Rule satisﬁes Equal Cost Bounds under increasing incremental cost. This generalizes
the Unanimity Bound of Moulin and Shenker (1992).
The paper is organized as follows. For the sake of completeness, we give the complete
formulation of the problem and the main deﬁnitions in Section 2. This is completed by the
deﬁnition of diminishing and increasing incremental cost and some of its implications. The
Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule is deﬁned again in Section 3. Monotonicity is the object of
Section 4 while the bounds for cost shares and participation are dealt with in Section 5. A
brief conclusion follows as Section 6. Most proofs are collected in the last section.
2 The Cost Sharing Problem
A cost sharing problem starts with a proﬁle of demands, to which a cost function is applied.
In serial cost sharing, demands may have to be scaled down to meet certain conditions.
In a multidimensional context, this can be done in many diﬀerent ways. The cost sharing
problem must thus be completed by a description of how this should be done. We address
each of these elements in the next three subsections.
2.1 The demands
Throughout this paper, as in Téjédo and Truchon (2002), there is a ﬁxed set of divisible
commodities K = {1,...,k} and a ﬁxed set of agents N = {1,...,n}. The commodities
may be goods, characteristics serving to describe needs, or speciﬁcations of a certain facility.
A commodity may be speciﬁc to a particular agent or a subset of agents. This means that
these agents are the only ones to be able to consume, use, or enjoy the commodity in question.
Hence, they will be the only ones to demand positive quantities of this commodity. As for
non speciﬁc commodities, they may be private or public or anything in between.
For each agent i ∈ N, let there be a positive integer mi ≤ k and a one-to-one function
 i: {1,...,m i} → K, specifying the list of commodities that may be requested by this agent.
Next, let Mi be the range of  i, i.e. Mi = { i(1),...,  i(mi)}. In plain words, Mi is the
subset of commodities for which agent i may request a positive quantity. By assumption,
K = ∪n
i=1Mi. Thus, for each commodity, there is at least one agent concerned by this
commodity.
The demand of agent i is described by a vector qi ∈ R
mi
+ . The scalar qih is the demand of
commodity  i(h) ∈ Mi by agent i. Let M = {M1,...,M n} with cardinality m =
Pn
i=1 mi ≤





+ . Given a subset S ⊂ N
and Q ∈ Rm
+, let QS ∈ Rm
+ be the vector obtained from Q by changing all components
qj,j∈ N\S, for components of 0.
32.2 The cost function
To complete the description of the problem, we are given a cost function C : Rm
+ → R+. The
cost of producing a bundle Y ∈ Rm
+ is C (Y ). Ac o s tf u n c t i o nC : Rm
+ → R+ induces n stand
alone cost functions ci : R
mi









+ , let yi ¿ y0
i mean yih <y 0
ih,h=1 ,...,m i. We shall say that ci : R
mi
+ → R+
is increasing if yi ¿ y0
i implies ci (yi) <c i (y0
i). Thus, ci is increasing if an increase in all
components of yi yields a cost increase.
Let C(m) be the class of continuous and non-decreasing functions C : Rm
+ → R+ satisfy-
ing:
• C (0) = 0,
• the functions ci,i=1 ,...,n,induced by C are increasing,
• ∀Y ∈ Rm








= C−i (Y−i), where C−i is the restriction of C to the
reduced proﬁle Y−i =( y1,...,y i−1,y i+1,...,y n).
We shall work with this class of functions throughout the paper. Whereas we need the
mild assumption that each ci be increasing, we do not want to impose and we do not need
that C be increasing. In other words, Y ≤ Y 0 ∈ Rm
+ and yi ¿ y0
i for some i do not necessarily
imply C (Y ) <C(Y 0). Indeed, C may be the result of a more or less complex aggregation
and optimization procedure. Thus, it is not necessarily increasing in all its components as,
for example, when some public goods are involved. The last two conditions deﬁning C(m)
are natural. A demand from an agent with null stand alone cost has the same impact on
total cost than a null demand and removing an agent with a null demand from a problem
should have no impact on total cost.
A special case is Mi = K ∀i and C (Y )=c(
P
i yi) with c : Rk
+ → R+. In this case,
all commodities are homogeneous and private. Following Moulin and Shenker (1994) and
Sprumont (1998), we call these functions and the resulting problems homogeneous.
2.3 Diminishing or Increasing Incremental Cost
In this paper, the behavior of the incremental cost, i.e.the change in cost following an
increase in the level of production, often plays a crucial role. Some results may depend on
4the incremental cost being decreasing or increasing with the level of production. Thus, we
need appropriate deﬁnitions of these terms.
Ad e ﬁnition that comes naturally to mind for Diminishing Incremental Cost is: for any
triple (Y,Y 0,Z) ∈ R3m
+ such that Y ≤ Y 0, i ts h o u l db et h ec a s et h a tC (Y + Z) − C (Y ) ≥
C (Y 0 + Z)−C (Y 0). However, this deﬁnition is not suﬃc i e n tf o ro u rp u r p o s eb e c a u s ew es h a l l
have to compare the impacts on costs of changes in diﬀerent and heterogeneous components
of the demand. The deﬁnition that follows allows for this heterogeneity. It encompasses the
preceding proposition as a special case.
Deﬁnition 1 Ac o s tf u n c t i o nC ∈ C(m) has the Diminishing Incremental Cost (DIC)
property if for any triple (Y,Y 0,Z) ∈ R3m
+ such that Y ≤ Y 0 and any pair (i,j) ∈ N2 such












It has the Increasing Incremental Cost (IIC) property if (1) holds with the reverse inequality.
This deﬁnition may be justiﬁed as follows. Note ﬁrst that the condition ci (yi + zi) −




















Adding Y {j} and Y {i} to the arguments of the left and right members respectively should
bring a lower value for both to meet the claim that incremental costs are decreasing. However,
the condition ci (yi) ≥ cj (yj) means that yi is in a sense “larger” than yj. Thus Y {i} is “larger”
than Y {j} and the value of the right member of (2) should decrease more than the left one





























− C (Y )
Finally,1 changing Y for Y 0 in the right member can just reinforce this inequality to meet
the claim that incremental costs are decreasing. This is precisely what (1) says.
1If we had ci (yi)=cj (yj) to start with then, all above inequalities would become equalities and we could
say that Z{i} is equivalent to (of the same size as) Z{j}. This would follow from C
¡
Y + Z{i}¢




− C (Y ) and from ci (yi + zi) − ci (yi)=cj (yj + zj) − cj (yj) a sw e l l .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
the principle, common to the Axial, the Radial, and the Path Serial Rules, that the demands of two agents
are equivalent if they have the same stand alone cost.
5(DIC) has several implications, which are recorded in the following lemma. The second
implication will be used in proving the cross monotonicity of the path serial rule and the
third in the proof of participation.
Lemma 1 If C ∈ C(m) satisﬁes (DIC), then:
1. For any triple (Y,Y 0,Z) ∈ R3m
+ such that Y ≤ Y 0, the following must hold:
C (Y + Z) − C (Y ) ≥ C (Y
0 + Z) − C (Y
0) (3)
2. For any Z ∈ Rm
+, let I (Z)={i ∈ N : zi 6=0 }. Then, given a triple (Y,Y 0,Z) ∈
R3m
+ and a h ∈ I (Z) such that Y ≤ Y 0,Y+ Z ≤ Y 0 + Z{h},c i (yi) ≥ ch (yh) and
ci (yi + zi) − ci (yi)=ch (yh + zh) − ch (yh) ∀i ∈ I (Z), the following must hold:











3. For any pair (Y,Y 0) ∈ Rm
+ × Rm








ci (yi) ≥ C (Y
0) − C (Y ) (5)
4. Let C ∈ C2 and for any triple (Y,Z,W) ∈ R3m
+ such that kZk = kWk =1 , let
D
++
WZC (Y ) be the (second order) right derivative in direction W of the ﬁrst order right
derivative of C in direction Z at point C. Then, D
++
WZC (Y ) ≤ 0.
The above propositions hold with the reverse inequality if C satisﬁes (IIC).
The proof of the lemma is given in subsection 7.1. The ﬁrst implication of (DIC) is
precisely the statement that we rejected as not being suﬃcient for our purpose. The second
implication has the following interpretation. Suppose that Y = Y 0 and that many compo-
nents of the demand are increased simultaneously, bringing a total cost increase given by the
left member of (4). Then (4) says that the average of this cost increase (the total cost change
divided by the number of components responsible for this change) should not be less than
the incremental cost of any of the individual changes in the demand. This is similar to the
property that a concave one-good cost function gives an average cost that it not lower than
marginal cost. The last property is reminiscent of another property of concave functions but
it is weaker in that it says something only about right derivatives in non-negative directions.




i) − C (Y 0) ≥
n P
i=1
ci (yi) − C (Y ),
the third implication of (DIC) may be called increasing beneﬁt from cooperation.
62.4 The paths
Serial cost sharing requires that larger demands be initially scaled down to a level equivalent
to smaller ones. In multidimensional contexts, this can be done in many diﬀerent ways more





+ , which map each y ∈ R
mi
+ and τ ∈ R+ o n t oav e c t o rhi (y,τ) ∈ R
mi
+ . Assume that hi (y, ·)
is non-decreasing, increasing without bound in at least one component, and that for each
y ∈ R
mi
+ , there exists a τ0 ∈ R+ (necessarily unique) such that hi (y,τ0)=y. Let Hi be the
class of these functions. Then, hi (y,R+) is the path through y deﬁned by hi (y, ·). Clearly,
the class {hi (y,R+):y ∈ R
mi
+ } scans R
mi
+ since hi is deﬁned for each y ∈ R
mi




+ \{0}×R+ → R
mi
+ be deﬁned by hR
i (y,τ)=τy. This function deﬁnes the ray
through a y 6=0 .
We do not impose that hi (y,0) = 0 and that hi (y, ·) be continuous and increasing
in all components. However, given a function C ∈ C(m), we restrict ourselves to the
class of functions Hi (ci) ⊂ Hi for which ci (hi (y, ·)) is continuous and increasing, with
ci (hi (y,0)) = 0. Since ci (0) = 0 and since ci is increasing, this implies that there is at least
one null component in hi (y,0). In words, a path starts on an axis but not necessarily at
the origin. The cost of the bundle at the starting point is null and increasing thereafter.
This deﬁnition of Hi (ci) insures that for any α ∈ R+, there is a unique τα such that
ci (hi (y,τα)) = α.
The paths to be used depend on the problem at hand. We thus include their deﬁni-
tions in the speciﬁcation of the problem. Let H(C)=H1 (c1) ×···×H n (cn),H(Y,τ)=
(h1 (y1,τ1),...,h n (yn,τn)),a n dC(m)×H= {(C,H):C ∈ C(m) and H ∈ H(C)}. A cost
sharing problem is a triple (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ ×C(m)×H(C). Accordingly, a cost sharing rule
is a mapping ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn




The vector ξ (Q,C,H) i st h el i s to fc o s ts h a r e sf o rt h ep r o b l e m(Q,C,H).
H is exogenous as is the case of Q. T h ec h o i c eo fhi may come from agent i, be imposed
by the planner or be negotiated between all those concerned. The criteria leading to the
adoption of a particular hi may include technological considerations or preferences. For
example, the diﬀerent components of qi may pertain to diﬀerent technical characteristics of
a facility and for technological reasons that only agent i knows, any change in qi should be
7done according to a function hi (not necessarily linear) supplied by the agent. Alternatively,
hi may be the expression of a preference by the agent.2
3 The Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule
In essence, this rule consists in ﬁrst ordering individual demands according to their stand
alone costs. Next, a ﬁrst intermediate demand is constructed by reducing demands of agents
2 to n along the respective paths speciﬁed by the hi, down to the points where their stand
alone costs are equal to the one of agent 1 and the cost of this intermediate demand is
shared equally among all agents. A second intermediate demand is constructed by reducing
demands of agents 3 to n along the same paths down to the point where their stand alone
costs are equal to the one of agent 2. The incremental cost of this intermediate demand
as compared to the ﬁrst one is shared equally among agents 2 to n. A n ds oo nu n t i lt h e
intermediate demand turns out to be the original.
Deﬁnition 2 (The Path Serial Rule) Given a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+×C(m)×H(C),
suppose, without loss of generality, that agents are ranked according to their ci (qi):
c1 (q1) ≤ c2 (q2) ≤ ...≤ cn (qn).






j = qj if cj (qj) ≤ ci (qi)
qi





= ci (qi) if cj (qj) >c i (qi)
By deﬁnition of H(C), these intermediate demands are uniquely deﬁned. Finally, the cost






C (Qj) − C (Qj−1)
n +1− j
,i=1 ,...,n.
Remark 2 The Radial Serial Rule ξ
RS of Koster et al. (1998) may be seen as the Path Serial
Rule ξ
PSwith the use of hR








RS reduce to the Axial Rule ξ
A of
Sprumont (1998) when Mi = {i} ∀i and all three reduce to the Moulin-Shenker rule in the
context of the single private good. They are Serial Extensions of the original Serial Rule.
2In Boyer, Moreaux and Truchon (2003), one can ﬁnd an application of serial cost sharing to an under-
ground network of pipes and wires where a particular kind of path appeared as the natural way of handling
the problem. See in particular Appendix B.
84 Monotonicity
An ethical condition that has received much attention in the literature on cost sharing is
monotonicity of the cost shares with respect to own demands. The Path Serial Rule does
not satisfy the original monotonicity condition in the general context but we show that it
satisﬁes a weaker form of this condition, called Path Demand Monotonicity. We also examine
the behavior of the cost shares with respect to others’ demands.
Deﬁnition 3 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ ×C(m)×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Demand Monotonicity
(DM) if for two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H0) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C), and any i ∈ N
such that qi ≤ q0
i and qj = q0
j ∀j ∈ N\{i}, we have ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξi (Q0,C,H0).
(DM) says that an agent should expect to pay more if he increases his demand. This
does not imply that the other agents will not pay more as we shall see. Sprumont (1998)
proves that the Axial Rule ξ
A satisﬁes (DM) in the context where Mi = {i} ∀i. In Téjédo
and Truchon (2000), we show that this is not the case of the Radial Serial Rule ξ
RS even in
the homogeneous context. A fortiori, the Path Serial Rule ξ
PS does not satisfy (DM) in the
general context. This motivates the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H → Rn
+ satisﬁes Path Demand
Monotonicity (PDM) if for two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C),
for any i ∈ N such that qi ∈ hi (q0
i,R+),q i ≤ q0
i, and qj = q0
j ∀j ∈ N\{i}, we have
ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξi (Q0,C,H).
Ideally if the cost function satisﬁes decreasing incremental cost (DIC), then the cost share
of an agent should not increase when the demand of another agent increases and it should
not decrease when the cost function satisﬁes increasing incremental cost (IIC). We shall show
that this is the case with the Path Serial Rule.
Deﬁnition 5 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Negative Path Cross
Monotonicity (NPCM) if for two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C)
such that qk ∈ hk (q0
k,R+) and qk ≤ q0
k for some k and qi = q0
i ∀i ∈ N/{k}, we have
ξi (Q,C,H) ≥ ξi (Q0,C,H) ∀i ∈ N/{k}.I t s a t i s ﬁes Positive Path Cross Monotonicity
(PPCM) if under the same circumstances, ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξi (Q0,C,H) ∀i ∈ N/{k}, i.e. ξi
is a non-decreasing function along the path hk (qk,R+).
Theorem 1 ξ
PS satisﬁes (PDM). It also satisﬁes (NPCM) whenever C is a DIC cost func-
tion and (PPCM) whenever C is an IIC cost function.
9The proof is given in subsection 7.2. Of course, we should expect the relation between
ξ
PS
i (Q,C,H) and ξ
PS
i (Q0,C,H) to hold when more than one component of Q is increased
to give Q0. This is recorded in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) and
an agent i ∈ N such that qi = q0





and qj ≤ q0
j ∀j ∈ N/{i}. Then:
• ξ
PS
i (Q,C,H) ≥ ξ
PS
i (Q0,C,H) whenever C is a DIC cost function;
• ξ
PS
i (Q,C,H) ≤ ξ
PS
i (Q0,C,H) whenever C is an IIC cost function.
T h ep r o o fi sg i v e ni ns u b s e c t i o n7 . 3 .
5 Bounds for Cost Shares and Participation
If they are free to decide, agents will choose to participate in a cost sharing problem only
if they are guaranteed that their share of the cost will not be larger than their stand alone
cost. This is a condition that Moulin and Shenker (1992) calls participation.W e s h o w
that the Path Serial Rule meets this condition whenever C satisﬁes increasing beneﬁtf r o m
cooperation,d e ﬁned in Remark 1. Actually, under (DIC), the Path Serial Rule satisﬁes a
stronger property. Any coalition of agents is guaranteed that their total share of the cost will
not be larger than their stand alone cost as a coalition, a condition called the Stand Alone
Test by Faulhaber (1975) and similar to the core property in cooperative game theory. We
show that these properties, established by Moulin (1996) in the single private good context,
extend to the general context of this paper under increasing beneﬁt from cooperation or
diminishing incremental cost.
If the cost function satisﬁes (IIC) instead of (DIC), we should not expect all agents to
be willing to cooperate since at least one of them will have to pay more than its stand alone
cost. However, there may be circumstances where agents are forced to cooperate even if the
cost function satisﬁes (IIC). For ethical reasons, we could then require that each agent or
coalition pays at least its stand alone cost, the reverse of the previous conditions.3 The Path
Serial rule satisﬁes these reverse conditions.
3This can be seen as a fairness condition, to which Moulin and Shenker (1992) gave the name of Stand
Alone Test. However, Faulhaber (1975), Moulin (1996), and others reserve this name for the condition
deﬁned above. In this paper, we cover both conditions under the same name.
10Deﬁnition 6 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes Participation for
ap r o b l e m(Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) if ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ci (qi) ∀i ∈ N.I t s a t i s ﬁes
Anti-Participation if ξi (Q,C,H) ≥ ci (qi) ∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 2 The Path Serial Rule ξ
PS satisﬁes Participation when C satisﬁes increasing
beneﬁt from cooperation. It satisﬁes Anti-Participation when C satisﬁes decreasing beneﬁt
from cooperation.
T h ep r o o fi sg i v e ni ns u b s e c t i o n7 . 4 .
Deﬁnition 7 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes the Stand Alone Test
(SAT) for a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ ×C(m)×H(C) if
P




subset S ⊂ N. It satisﬁes the Anti-Stand Alone Test (ASAT) if
P
i∈S ξi (Q,C,H) ≥ C
¡
QS¢
for any subset S ⊂ N.
Theorem 3 Any cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ × C(m) ×H→ Rn
+ that satisﬁes (NPCM) also
meets the Stand Alone Test (SAT). Similarly, any cost sharing rule that satisﬁes (PPCM)
also meets the Anti-Stand Alone Test (ASAT).
The proof is given in subsection 7.5. Combining Theorems 1 and 3 yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 2 The Path Serial Rule ξ
PS satisﬁes (SAT) whenever C is a DIC cost function
and it satisﬁes (ASAT) whenever C is an IIC cost function.
Remark 3 Participation follows obviously from (SAT). However, we have been able to
establish this property under the weaker increasing beneﬁt from cooperation.A s i m i l a r
remark applies to Anti-Participation.
The other question of interest in the case of an IIC cost function is whether there is a
reasonable upper bound on the contribution of each agent. In order to introduce such a
bound, we ﬁrst deﬁne for each i an equal cost demand ˜ Qi ∈ Rm
+, by scaling the demands up











= ci (qi) if cj (qj) <c i (qi)
˜ qi





= ci (qi) if cj (qj) ≥ ci (qi)
We then have the following condition.
11Deﬁnition 8 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm
+ ×C(m)×H→ Rn
+ satisﬁes the Equal Cost Bound
(ECB) for a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm












= c(nq i). Thus, (ECB) generalizes the Unanimity
Bound of Moulin and Shenker (1992). Clearly, ξ
PS satisﬁes (ECB) for DIC cost functions.
We shall now show that this bound is also satisﬁed for IIC cost functions.
Theorem 4 The Path Serial Rule ξ
PS satisﬁes (ECB) for any class of problems (Q,C,H) ∈
Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) such that C is an IIC cost function.
Proof. Since ˜ qi
j ≥ qi
j = qj ∀j<iand ˜ qi
j = qi
























6C o n c l u s i o n
In Téjédo and Truchon (2002), we have deﬁned the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule to deal with
problems where agents request several commodities that can be public, private, or speciﬁct o
some of them and where aggregation may be very general. As it names implies, it consists in
scaling down the demands along paths, which are part of the speciﬁcation of the problem, in
order to construct the intermediate demands that are at the root of serial cost sharing. Put
diﬀerently, the Path Serial Rule consists in applying the original Serial Cost Sharing Rule to
a projection of each demand onto the speciﬁed path. The rule is characterized by the Equal
Treatment of Equivalents (demands) and the Path Serial Principle, and it satisﬁes other
properties such as Independence of Null Agents, Rank Independence of Irrelevant Agents,
and Ordinality.
In the present paper, we have extended the analysis of this rule by examining how the
cost share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents.
We have shown that the Path Serial Rule satisﬁes Path Demand Monotonicity, i.e.the cost
share of an agent does not decrease if the demand of this agent increases along the path
speciﬁed with its demand. Under an appropriate assumption of increasing returns, the rule
12also satisﬁes Negative Path Cross Monotonicity, i.e.the cost share of an agent must not
increase if some other agent increases its demand along the path speciﬁed with its demand.
It satisﬁes Positive Path Cross Monotonicity under decreasing returns.
We have also provided bounds for cost shares under increasing and decreasing returns.
More precisely, under increasing returns, no agent and no subset of agents pay more than
their stand alone cost. Under decreasing returns, no agent and no subset of agents pay less
than their stand alone cost. These results generalize similar results of Moulin and Shenker
(1994) and Moulin (1996) for the original Serial Rule.
137P r o o f s
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
1. Applying (1) iteratively to the triples
¡
Y + Z{1,...,i−1},Y0 + Z{1,...,i−1},Z
¢
and the pair



















and summing member-wise over i yields (3).
2. Consider any increasing sequence S1,S 2,...,S #I(Z) of proper subsets of I (Z) such that
h belongs only to S#I(Z) and let S0 = ∅. Note that j is the cardinality of Sj and that
















with ZS0 =0 . Summing over all j ∈ I (Z) yields (4).
3. Consider the triples
³
Y {i},Y0{i}, ˆ Zi
´

































i) − ci (yi)=C (0,...,0,y
0



















Summing member-wise over i yields (5).
4. Let Y 0 = Y + W. Then, by (3)
D
+
ZC (Y ) = lim
λ↓0
















ZC (Y ) ≤ 0
Replacing Y 0 by Y + λW in the last expression and taking the limit again we get,
D
++









147.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0,C,H) ∈ Rm
+ × C(m) ×H(C) such that C is an
IIC cost function and such that qk ∈ hk (q0
k,R+),q 0
k ≥ qk for some k and q0
j = qj ∀j 6= k.
We shall show that ξ
PS
i (Q,C,H) ≤ ξ
PS
i (Q0,C,H) ∀i ∈ N. We ﬁrst suppose that c1 (q1) ≤
c2 (q2) ≤ ...≤ cn (qn) and c1 (q0
1) ≤ c2 (q0
2) ≤ ...≤ cn (q0
n). We must distinguish four cases:




i (Q,C,H) by (PSP).
• i = k : In this case, ξ
PS
i (Q0,C,H) ≥ ξ
PS
i (Q,C,H) since C (Q0i) ≥ C (Qi),C(Q0i−1)=




j (Q,C,H) ∀j<k .This, together with the comple-
ment given below for the case where the ranks of the agents are changed when going
from Q to Q0, establishes (PDM).





















































































































k)−ck (qk), i.e. cj (yj + zj)−cj (yj)=ck (yk + zk)−ck (yk) ∀j ≥
k. Also note that Y + Z = Q0k ≤ Q0k+1 = Y 0 + Z{k}. Thus, (6) follows from part 2 of
Lemma 1 and more precisely from (4) with the reversed inequality.
• i>k+1:In this case, Q0i − Qi = Q0i−1 − Qi−1, with q0
k − qk as the only positive
component and Qi−1 ≤ Qi.T h u s ,C (Q0i−1) −C (Qi−1) ≤ C (Q0i) −C (Qi) by (IIC) or
15part 1 of Lemma 1, from which C (Qi) − C (Qi−1) ≤ C (Q0i) − C (Q0i−1). Combining
this last inequality with ξ
PS
j (Q,C,H) ≤ ξ
PS
j (Q0,C,H) ∀j<iyields the result.
Next, suppose that the order of the stand alone costs is changed when going from













whenever k + p +1≤ n. Then, consider a sequence Q =
ˆ Q0, ˆ Q1,..., ˆ Qp = Q0, where ˆ q 
j = qj ∀j 6= k and where ˆ q 











= ck+  (qk+ ), =1 ,...,p− 1. In other words, ˆ Q1 is obtained
by increasing qk to get a ˆ q1
k such that qk ∈ hk (ˆ q1
k,R+) and c(ˆ q1
k)=ck+1 (qk+1). ˆ Q2 is
obtained by further increasing qk until its stand alone cost reaches ck+2 (qk+2) and so









i is non-decreasing along this sequence of problems and thus:
ξ
PS


















It suﬃces to change the sense of the relevant inequalities when C is a DIC cost function.
7.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that C is an IIC cost function and consider a sequence Q = ˆ Q0, ˆ Q1,..., ˆ Qn = Q0,






j if j ≤ k
qj if j>k
In plain word, each component is increased, if needed, one at a time along this sequence until
Q0 is reached. Then, by Theorem 1, ξ
PS
























7.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that C satisﬁes increasing beneﬁt from cooperation. We proceed by induction.





























cj (qj)+( n − i +1 )ci−1 (qi−1)









≤ (n − i +1 )[ ci (qi) − ci−1 (qi−1)]
Collecting all the above yields:
ξi (Q,C,H)=ξi−1 (Q,C,H)+
C (Qi) − C (Qi−1)
n − i +1
≤ ci−1 (qi−1)+
C (Qi) − C (Qi−1)
n − i +1
≤ ci (qi)
It suﬃce to reverse all inequalities when C satisﬁes decreasing beneﬁtf r o mc o o p e r a t i o n .
7.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider a cost sharing rule ξ satisfying (NPCM), a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm
+×C(m)×H(C),
and any proper subset S ⊂ N. Let ˜ Q be the proﬁle of demands obtained by substituting
hi (qi,0) to qi in Q for all i/ ∈ S. By deﬁnition of H(C), we have ci (hi (qi,0)) = 0 and




=0 . Since ˜ Q
N\S
S ≤ ˜ QS, using (NPCM), more precisely



































where the last equality follows from the deﬁnition of C(m). Using the above, (NPCM), and














The proof is similar under (PPCM).
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